Russians will vote in a presidential election from March 15–17, 2024, and Vladimir Putin is almost certain to win a comfortable victory, allowing him to remain in power until at least 2030. While the outcome may be predictable, the election provides an essential view into the Kremlin’s domestic issues as it continues its war with Ukraine, which has now reached its third year.
Here are the three significant developments to look out for during and after Russia’s presidential election. Yes, we know Putin will win. Nonetheless, this election represents the most public test of the Russian state’s ability to mould its intended outcome domestically since its full-fledged invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Things to look out for in Russia’s presidential election
1. Don’t mention the war
The 2024 election takes place during the biggest interstate battle of the century. With Russian domestic media and politics virtually devoid of alternative voices, the war has become the organizing principle of post-2022 Russian politics, influencing all key policies and decisions. However, while the war’s context is important, its role is mostly implied rather than central. And with good reason: banging the war drums is not particularly popular. In fact, throughout the conflict, the Kremlin’s approach has relied on the general public’s acceptance and disengagement from the war effort in exchange for a sense of normalcy at home.
2. Pressure to deliver results for Putin
While autocratic regimes, such as Russia’s, have shown skill at manipulating the electoral process to eliminate challengers and prevent upsets, elections remain high-stakes events. For officials, the election represents a litmus test of their capacity to marshal administrative resources and deliver Putin an electoral victory. Most reports indicate that the Kremlin is expecting to arrange a turnout of at least 70%, with Putin receiving approximately 80% of the vote, which would beat his 76.7% share in 2018. For observers of Russian politics, what will be of interest is not the outcome itself, but how it is achieved under wartime conditions. Consider securing a strong attendance. Local politicians in Russia frequently adopt the approach of putting pressure on state personnel and workers from state-owned corporations to turn up at the polls en masse.
3. Silencing political opposition
The death of veteran Putin critic Alexei Navalny in February 2024 dealt a significant blow to the opposition, but it also reflects the status of political repression in Russia. Since 2018, around 116,000 Russians have endured political repression. Under these conditions, the presidential election will be the least pluralistic in post-Soviet Russia, with only four contenders on the ballot and no openly anti-war personalities among them. Previous elections have usually included a candidate from the so-called “liberal opposition.” For a time, it appeared that this tendency would continue in the shape of independent Boris Nadezhdin, whose strong anti-war platform helped him garner unexpected support compared to other potential contenders.
However, by prohibiting Nadezhdin from running, the Kremlin presumably hoped to avoid a recurrence of 2018, when the Communist Party’s Pavel Grudinin unexpectedly struck a chord with voters with his down-to-earth populism. This prompted the state media to go into overdrive, transforming the election into a mudslinging match. However, the intensity of popular sorrow for Navalny and enthusiasm for Nadezhdin demonstrate that, despite harsh wartime restrictions and persecution, there is still a substantial fraction of Russians looking for genuine political options. For the time being, the closest contender to an alternative looks to be Vladislav Davankov of the liberal-leaning party “New People,” who is expected to attract votes from some of this anti-war group. Indeed, the first point on his manifesto calls for “peace and negotiations,” though “on our terms.” Fresh polling data from state-owned VTsIOM suggests that he might well take second place.
